The New Yorker: How vulnerable is G.P.S.?

The New Yorker: How vulnerable is G.P.S.?
By Greg Milner

    G.P.S powers many things, from drones to missiles to everyday navigation. It is operated by satellites orbiting at 20 thousand kilometers and a secure Air Force base in Colorado. Each satellite emits a faint radio signal, and the receiver uses signals from multiple satellites to determine its location in three dimensions. As the uses of this tech have expanded, so have the people trying to exploit it.

    Jammers create radio disturbance, preventing receivers from getting the right signal and stranding them. A more dangerous form has emerged more recently, and it is called spoofing. It can transmit a fake radio signal that overrides the real one, changing the destination of a drone or missile, or making it look like you are somewhere you aren't.

    For example, sailors near Russia and the mainland repeated reported that their GPS showed their location as an airport that could sometimes be thousands of kilometers away. This also happened on Uber rides, making riders pay far more. A think tank conducted a study and speculated that Russian President Putin's security force may have used spoofers to prevent drone attacks on the head of state. A similar occurrence popped off the coast of China, though researched showed that this one was probably a rogue that failed to cover their tracks, not the government. This was because the attacks were more spaced out. Another difference was that the false locations were relocated to many different places.

    Officials have only recently admitted it, but the GPS system needs security updates. Its closest competitors are nowhere close to its capabilities, and it must be prepared for attack.